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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary provides a summary of prevailing
environmental decisions decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit since the last issue of the William
and Mary EnvironmentalLaw and Policy Review. It does not
cover every environmental decision of the Fourth Circuit during
that time period, but only those cases which the editors believe
to be of the most interest to our subscribers.
ENDANGERED SPECIES

United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 1994).
A grand jury indicted Richard Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an employee of the
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") of the United States Department of the
Interior, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 by smuggling the horns and hides of
illegally hunted animals into the United States. Section 545 makes it a felony to
knowingly import merchandise "contrary to law." Count Nine of the indictment
charged Mitchell with the failure to declare the horns and hides, complete FWS
Form 3-177, and satisfactorily show to the Veterinary Service the country of
origin of the horns and hides ("Agriculture regulations"). The district court
convicted Mitchell of a felony under Count Nine.
Mitchell appealed the conviction, arguing that (1) the "contrary to law"
provision in § 545 does not encompass violations of administrative regulations,
and (2) the felony conviction could not be predicated upon a regulation for which
Congress had provided a misdemeanor punishment. In response to Mitchell's first
argument, the court found that the "contrary to law" provision in § 545 included,
in addition to acts of Congress, substantive agency regulations. The court
followed the Supreme Court's holding in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979), that substantive agency regulations have the "full force and effect of law"
if they (1) affect individual rights and obligations, (2) are promulgated pursuant
to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority, and (3) are promulgated in
conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act.
The FWS regulation violated by Mitchell was enacted pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"). The Fourth Circuit found that
Congress had authorized the FWS regulation requiring persons importing game
trophies to complete FWS Form 3-177 to determine if the animal was an
endangered species. The Agriculture regulation was proclaimed through 21
U.S.C. § 111. Section 111 gave the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to
regulate the importation of animal products to prevent the introduction of disease.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that both the FWS provision and Agriculture regulations
were substantive agency regulations under the Chryslertest and were, therefore,
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enforceable under § 545.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Mitchell's second argument that there is
no "inherent difficulty" with Congress criminalizing the same conduct under more
than one statute, even where violation of one statute is predicated on violation of
the other. In addition, the court stated that the existence of these regulations
criminalizing the same conduct as the statutes did not repeal by implication the
statutes. Because the court found no irreconcilable conflict between the statutes,
it affirmed Mitchell's conviction.
NEPA
In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1994).
The City of Virginia Beach, Virginia ("Virginia Beach") sought a writ of
mandamus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to compel the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ('TERC") to enter a final decision regarding its review
of a water pipeline project proposed by Virginia Beach. Virginia Beach claimed
that FERC violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), by
unnecessarily failing to enter a decision on the proposed pipeline within a
reasonable time. The Fourth Circuit held that, notwithstanding the protracted
delay, FERC's conduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied Virginia Beach's
petition for the writ of mandamus.
The proposed pipeline would connect Lake Gaston, located on the North
Carolina-Virginia border, with Virginia Beach and would carry sixty million
gallons of water for daily use by the people of Virginia Beach. After receiving
approval to construct the pipeline from the Army Corps of Engineers in early
1984, Virginia Beach requested that Virginia Electric and Power Company
("VEPCO") file an application with FERC to transfer VEPCO's easements at
Lake Gaston to Virginia Beach for use with the pipeline. VEPCO agreed to file
the application but waited to do so until the courts had affirmed the Army Corps
of Engineers permit in February 1991.
FERC stayed review of VEPCO's application while the Department of
Commerce considered an objection by North Carolina to the proposed pipeline.
In July 1993, Virginia Beach petitioned the Fourth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus when FERC reversed its earlier position and ordered an environmental
impact statement ("EIS") which would be completed by June 1995. Virginia
Beach contended that FERC acted unreasonably in disregarding previous
environmental analyses of the same issues by the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce had overridden the
North Carolina objection four months prior to the presentation of arguments
before the Fourth Circuit. Virginia Beach alleged further that neither FERC's
own underlying analysis nor FERC's questions regarding the pipeline's future
uses and impact on the lower Roanoke River justified the order for an EIS.
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FERC argued that it had acted reasonably by following normal agency
procedures to stay VEPCO's application pending review of the North Carolina
objection by the Secretary of Commerce. FERC further argued that, due to
FERC's own standards for environmental review and the delays resulting from
VEPCO's lag in filing the application and the North Carolina objection, the
National Environmental Policy Act (CNEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2), required an
updated EIS to supplement VEPCO's current application. Recognizing the need
for a speedy review of the application, FERC instructed its staff to treat the
VEPCO EIS as a priority matter.
Virginia Beach argued that a writ of mandamus was necessary in order
to protect the health and safety of almost one million people from a public water
supply crisis and to maintain the operational readiness of the Norfolk naval
complex. Declining Virginia Beach's implicit invitation to review the substance
of FERC's decision to order the EIS, the Fourth Circuit looked instead to FERC's
duty to comply with NEPA, its adherence to established agency procedures, and
its repeated assurances of expedited review of the VEPCO EIS.

